Here is an example of Ockham’s voluntarist approach: Ockham took a strong – some would argue extreme – view of Divine sovereignty in relation to morality and ethics. One of the key figures in the development of these ideas was the monk and philosopher William of Ockham (c. The medieval scholastic philosophers wrestled with this question: Is God’s will a product of God’s rational nature, such that God only calls things “good” that are substantively “good”? Or is God’s will utterly unconstrained, such that God is free to call “good” whatever He desires to call “good,” without any limiting principle (referred to as “voluntarism”)? The modern nominalist view of “nature” derives from and is related to nominalist and “voluntarist” views of God in late medieval philosophy. (For a good overview of the problem of “universals,” see the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). This apple on my table has properties such as “red” in common with other apples because those common properties transcend any one particular apple. What is “real,” in this view, is merely chemistry and physical laws, not any substance “apple.” In contrast, for those who believe in universal properties, “apple” implies properties that are real and transcendent of any one apple. What is an apple? Is this particular apple on my kitchen table one instantiation of the substance “apple” – a substance with some sort of universal metaphysical (“beyond-“ or “above-“ physical) properties that are shared by all apples? Or is “apple” simply a name I apply to this object before me as a result of some observable similarities with other objects (other things we also call “apple”) that have no metaphysical connection to the “apple” on my table?įor many who claim a modern scientific worldview, there are only particular objects called “apple,” which are more or less related to other particular objects in morphology and chemical composition, all of which are categorized as “apples” for the sake of convenience. Philosophically, the question relates to whether “universal” substances exist apart from their particular instantiations (“universals”), or whether substances are merely names for particular instances of things (“nominalism”).Ĭonsider an apple. But is there something missing from their theodicies? Theologically, the question concerns the relation of God’s will to His nature. “Won’t God get what he wants?” So asks Rob Bell in his book “Love Wins.” It’s also fair to say that this question, along with the belief that God wants everyone to be saved, is the cornerstone of Bell’s theodicy of Hell.īoth Sprinkle / Chan and Bell focus on God’s will. “God can do ANYTHING he wants.” So say Preston Sprinkle and Francis Chan in their book “Erasing Hell.” It’s fair to say that this proposition is the cornerstone of Sprinkle and Chan’s theodicy of Hell.
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